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by Bank Supervisors
Although banks have been operating internationally for many hundreds of
years, cooperation among supervisors is a recent phenomenon and has been on
a relatively restricted basis. However, international cooperation in the area of
bank supervision moved into a higher gear with the agreement in July 1988 by
the supervisory authorities in the "Group of Ten" countries on an agreed frame-
work by which henceforward national authorities would measure the adequacy of
the capital of the international banks for which they were responsible and,
perhaps more significant, establish a set of minimum standards that all such
banks would be expected to achieve by the end of 1992.1
This article assesses the significance of that achievement, for the Basle Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision where the agreement was reached, for the su-
pervisory authorities represented there, for supervisory authorities in other coun-
tries, and for the banks themselves. It then describes the present and likely future
scope for international cooperation, including the relationship of the Basle Com-
mittee with other international organizations and groups.2
I. The 1988 Agreement
The 1988 agreement is a modest, unpretentious document and, perhaps to the
lawyer, rather unprepossessing. 3 The language is deliberately lay and avoids the
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precision of a legal text. It is not even called an agreement but rather a "frame-
work," a "statement," a "report," and a set of "recommendations." And it
contains not a single "whereas" clause. It is not even signed; it merely has a
footnote describing in general terms the sorts of institutions represented in the
Committee. The document claims to have been "endorsed" by the Group of Ten
central-bank Governors, but the inquiring investigator will find no statement
uttered by the Governors to verify this claim.
Indeed, on the face of it, the document is nothing more than a statement of
intent, a consensus that the authorities represented in the Committee "intend to
implement in their respective countries at the earliest opportunity." Moreover,
the document continues, "each country will decide the way in which the super-
visory authorities will introduce and apply these recommendations in the light of
their different legal structures and existing supervisory arrangements." The pa-
per goes on to note that there are indeed great differences in these arrangements
and the relative speed with which they can be changed.
There are a number of reasons for this informal approach. For a start, neither
the members of the Committee nor the institutions they represent have the power
to bind themselves formally in a treaty or any other form of legally binding
agreement, let alone to legislate for the supervisory authorities in the many other
countries which, as we shall see, have also applied the terms of the agreement to
banks within their jurisdiction. In fact, however, the terms of the agreement are
a good deal more precise than the language suggests. And the agreement secures
commitments considerably more precise than any of the Committee's previous
papers .7
Second, the agreement is concerned with ultimate objectives and not with
details per se. That is to say, provided the objectives are assured, the Committee
was quite content to allow these objectives to be achieved in whatever way
individual members felt appropriate. That way the Committee was not obliged to
require members to harmonize in detail their methods of supervision.
A flexible approach also has the advantage of permitting the agreement to be
adapted and interpreted to meet changing circumstances quite quickly. Supervi-
sors need to be able to respond to market developments and a much more rigid
agreement would have considerably weakened supervisors' ability to ensure that
the spirit of the agreement continues to be upheld.
A. THE OBJEcTIVES
Bankers and other observers have often defined the objective of the agreement
as the levelling of an uneven playing-field. But in fact that was not the principal
4. Editor's Note: Although Mr. Hayward is not writing as a lawyer, he raises, in this article,
issues of legal significance concerning the nature of this "evolving" rulemaking in the area of
international bank supervision. Are these "rules" becoming "soft law," and will a more formal
regulatory structure be required? Cf. Gold, Strengthening the Soft Law of Exchange Arrangements,
77 AM. J. INT'L L. 444 (1983).
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end in sight; rather, it was the means of achieving a strengthening of the capital
position of the international banking system. Systems of bank supervision have
not been created to ensure fair play, but to ensure the safety and soundness of
national banking systems and to protect the interests of depositors.
5
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the forces of competition, particularly for
international business, had tended to erode profit margins and therefore the
ability of banks to raise capital levels commensurate with the rate of growth of
their assets. Moreover, the need to maintain an adequate return on equity in the
face of declining returns on assets had encouraged banks to allow their capital
ratios to decline. In the 1980s, the international debt crisis cast considerable
doubt on the value of a sizable component of bank assets. The principal objective
of the agreement was, therefore, to counter what many perceived as a tendency
for the capital strength of the banking system to become less adequate. The need
felt by many supervisors to improve that strength could only be achieved by
assuring the banks that their competitors in other countries would be required to
achieve the same objectives. Indeed it was the overriding nature of this objective
that allowed members to commit their authorities to surrender long-held and
desirable aspects of their own supervisory systems in the interest of reaching
agreement.
B. IMPLEMENTATION
The agreement is essentially in two parts: a system of measurement and a set
of minimum standards. Implementation even of the measurement system is by no
means yet complete. Even in those countries where the supervisory authority has
a relatively free hand to amend its rules, changes of this sort take time. This is
true, even where the changes required were less extensive. For a start, substantial
alterations to the reporting requirements had to be set in place. These involved,
particularly in the case of off-balance-sheet transactions, collection of a large
amount of data that most supervisors had never collected before. It was therefore
necessary to enter into a dialogue with the banks as to the most effective way the
necessary information could be collected and presented. A good deal was and is
being learned by banks and supervisors of the nature of the risks being measured
in the process. In some countries this process was complete by the end of 1989,
but in others it is taking rather longer.
For countries where the banking legislation itself lays down in detail the
arithmetic for the calculation of solvency requirements, the process is necessarily
more protracted. And in some cases amendment of the legislation has only been
possible in the context of other reforms where the political interest, and therefore
the likelihood of delay, is even greater. In addition, member countries of the
5. See Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: A Legitimate Regulatory Concern for Prudential
Supervision of Banking Activities, OHIO ST. L.J. (Special Symposium, Winter 1989).
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European Community (EC) had been engaged in parallel negotiations as part of
the "1992" arrangements. These were not concluded until early in 1990, when
members finally agreed on the minimum requirements to which those countries
should adhere, having wisely delayed finalization until the discussions in Basle
had been concluded. Several member countries understandably felt it would be
preferable not to change their own national rules until both sets of negotiations
had been completed. However, as we shall see, these delays to the implemen-
tation process do not appear to have held up the process of adjustment.
The second aspect of implementation has been the attainment of certain min-
imum standards. In view of the ground to be covered by a number of banks, a
transitional period running up to the end of 1992 was allowed, with an interim
target to be reached by the end of 1990. The market has in fact tended to shorten
this transitional period. Indeed, preliminary results suggest the banks are making
faster progress towards the target minimum standards than many had believed
possible when the targets were first agreed in 1987.
C. SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE CoMMinFEE
There is no doubt that the capital agreement marked a quantum jump for the
Committee's role as a joint decision-making body. Previously, the Committee's
role had been largely a forum for the exchange of information, and a place where
supervisors could learn from each other and develop codes of best practice. Even
the Concordat which, by attributing responsibility for the various aspects of a
bank's international business, sought to ensure there were no gaps in the super-
visory system, and the Committee's paper on consolidation, which was part of
the same process, were but guidelines. The intention was that those supervisors
with inadequate or deficient powers could over time seek to make the necessary
changes. Meanwhile, at least a supervisor in one country would be aware of the
limits to the powers of a supervisor in another. This is by no means to belittle the
achievements of the first decade or so of the Committee's existence. Before the
Committee was established, international cooperation of course existed, but was
very much ad hoc. By the end of that period it was a permanent feature of the life
of all supervisory authorities with responsibility for banks operating
internationally.
6
Nevertheless, the capital agreement went much further. The discussions leading
up to it were much more in the way of negotiations because the participants were
aware that, at the end of the day, they would be expected to commit themselves
to ensuring that their own rules and procedures were fully consistent with the
outcome. Although not legally enforceable as a treaty, and although the Com-
mittee is not a formally constituted international organization, nonetheless the
6. See Norton, supra note 2.
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agreement is considered to be binding on the members and the agreement itself
states that the Committee will continually monitor its application.
Some feared that this process could change the character of the Committee and
that members would be reluctant to be as open and as frank as they had been in
the past. Moreover, as negotiators on behalf of their institutions, they might be
reluctant to contribute to the debate unless they were sure that their expressions
of view were capable of being, and had been, fully authorized at the appropriate
level by the institution they represented.
To some extent this fear has been borne out and the negotiations on the capital
agreement were extremely tough. But in other discussions members have been
just as frank, in part at least because members of the Committee have a good deal
of personal confidence in each other. In part, the process is helped because much
of the consensus building takes place in informal working groups where the
process of mutual education is allowed full rein. Thus, when the recommenda-
tions of such groups come before the full Committee and more formal discussion
takes place, there is considerably less scope for misunderstandings and discus-
sions are normally extremely fruitful.
The very informality of the language of the agreement has been a factor here
too. At the beginning there was a fear that banks would seek to abide by the letter
of the agreement but not necessarily by the spirit. Members of the Committee
were alive to the danger that, if this were possible in one country, other super-
visors would be under strong pressure to make similar concessions to banks
under their jurisdiction. The fear that the agreement might then unravel was a
powerful factor. Procedures were set up so that members could bring problems
to the Committee at an early stage and agree on a joint response. Moreover, the
Committee went further and, in the face of ingenious proposals by banks and
their advisers, took some tough and arbitrary decisions in order to avoid estab-
lishing precedents that could lead the Committee down a slippery slope. In
effect, the primary objective of strengthening the capital of international banks,
both in qualitative as well as quantitative terms, took precedence over the letter
of the agreement. Such a robust attitude might have been much more difficult to
enforce had the form of the agreement been such as to encourage quasi-litigation.
D. SIGNIFICANCE FOR MEMBERS
The existence of the Committee and the commitments that members undertake
there has undoubtedly affected the way supervisory authorities operate within
their own jurisdiction. Although many decisions that members take have purely
domestic implications, in an increasing proportion of cases the globalization of
the marketplace has meant that a decision in one country has implications for
banks and their supervisors elsewhere. Supervisors, therefore, need to be aware
of these implications, and the Committee provides a forum where they can be
discussed. In theory, this constraint could lead to legal conflicts but, in most
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countries now, the legal framework for the supervision of banks allows for con-
sultation with other supervisory authorities and indeed permits the exchange of
prudential information with the other supervisory authorities in countries where
banks have foreign establishments. Undoubtedly, the supervision of banks is more
complex than it was, but a supervisory authority's membership of the Committee,
although not without cost, has sufficient benefits to outweigh that cost.
E. IMPLICATION FOR OTHER SUPERVISORS
Although the capital agreement, and indeed other documents produced by the
Committee, are addressed to its members, that is, the bank supervisory author-
ities in the Group of Ten countries and Luxembourg, its work has very significant
implications for supervisory authorities in the many other countries in the world
with banks operating internationally.
The Committee could have reacted to this need by setting up an international
organization that such supervisory authorities could have been invited to join.
This would have been a cumbersome solution involving a great deal of work and
expense, both in the organization itself and for its members. For example,
legislation would probably have been necessary in most countries, thus adding a
political dimension to what is now principally a technical activity. As effective
a solution has been found by adopting a number of more practical measures.
The first was to encourage the establishment of a number of regional groupings
of supervisory authorities. Some of these, of course, would have come about
without the Committee's involvement and in two cases they predated the Com-
mittee. The first, a grouping of supervisors from the Nordic countries, goes back
to the 1920s. Much more recently, but still before the Committee's establish-
ment, the European Community's supervisors set up a so-called "Groupe de
Contact." Cooperation in the European Community has developed significantly
since then and will take a further step forward with the coming into force, at the
end of 1992, of the Second Banking Co-ordination Directive. By that time all
Community banks will have the right to provide services, including the right to
establish branches throughout the Community. This means that bank supervisors
must give automatic right of establishment to a branch of a bank supervised by
another Community supervisory authority. So, in effect, the host supervisor
cedes his authority to that of the supervisor in the country where the bank is
incorporated. EC members are prepared to do this because they have agreed to
mutually acceptable minimum standards of supervision incorporating the capital
adequacy framework agreed in Basle. 7
More recently still, groupings in the Caribbean, Latin America, Asia, and the
Middle East have been established, and at least one meeting of African super-
7. See generally 1992: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BANKING INDUSTRY (2d ed., R. Cranston ed.)
(to be published in Winter 1990 by Lloyd's Publications, London).
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visors has been held. The Chairman and members of the Committee have often
been invited to attend meetings of these groups and there is a continual exchange
of information at the working level.8
Secondly, beginning in 1979, a series of international conferences has been
held to which virtually all supervisory authorities have been invited; over one
hundred countries have been represented at these meetings. These conferences
provide a good opportunity for members of the Committee to be exposed to the
views of other supervisors and vice versa.
Thirdly, the Committee through its small permanent Secretariat in Basle, has
circulated the Committee's papers to all known supervisory authorities, orga-
nized training seminars, and handled an increasing number of inquiries from
supervisors all over the world. 9
Through these various methods, therefore, the Committee has ensured that the
means for wider international cooperation exists. But, of course, it is one thing
for the channels to be there; they have to be used.
Right from its earliest years the Committee has endeavored to persuade all
countries to adhere to the Concordat and to adapt their regulatory environment to
the requirements that the division of responsibility enshrined in the Concordat
demands.' 0 Essentially this involves amending confidentiality rules so that su-
pervisory authorities can communicate with the authorities in the other countries
in which a particular bank operates. A more detailed supplement to the Concor-
dat has recently been agreed, dealing specifically with the exchange of prudential
information, the relative rights and obligations of host and parent supervisors,
and the safeguards and constraints necessary to ensure that the principles of the
Concordat are properly implemented.
Similarly, the 1988 capital agreement has been recommended to the supervi-
sory authorities in other countries with international banks. Most such countries
have adopted, or are in the process of adopting the agreement, in some cases with
modifications to suit their own marketplace. The result is that there are few banks
operating internationally that are not now subject to the same set of minimum
standards of capital adequacy. This is an achievement comparable with that of
many long-standing international organizations with far more extensive formal
powers. Indeed, some have claimed that banking is the only industry subject to
effective regulation on a worldwide basis.
F. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BANKING SYSTEM
But it is the implications for the market in financial services and its users that
is the most important aspect of international cooperation between banking
8. See BASLE SUPERVISORS COMMITTEE, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKING
SUPERVISION, No. 6, PART IX (Sept. 1988) [hereinafter REPORT].
9. See Norton, supra note 2.
10. For a copy of the Revised Concordat, see II I.L.M. 900 (1983).
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supervisors. The 1988 capital agreement has clearly had a much more visible and
immediate impact on the way that banks operate than any previous cooperative
effort by supervisors, although in the long run the understanding on the respec-
tive roles of supervisors that underlies the earlier Concordat may have had a more
important effect by containing problems which might otherwise have had dele-
terious effects on the international banking system as a whole.
As has already been stated, the purpose of the capital agreement was to
strengthen the capital base of the banking system; in other words, a modification
in banks' behavior was the point of the exercise. It is interesting to note here the
rapidity with which the banks have reacted to publication of the proposals.
Because in some countries the adjustments required were very substantial, a
relatively long transitional period of five years (or about four-and-a-half years
after the final version of the agreement was published) was felt necessary. But as
evidence of the desire of the Committee to keep the pressure up, interim stan-
dards that had to be reached by the end of 1990 were incorporated. However, it
is already clear that banks have come under increasing pressure in the market-
place to advance the pace of adjustment. Banking depends on confidence, and
many banks have felt that, by demonstrating that their capital position is stronger
than the minimum level demanded by the supervisors, their position in the
market is enhanced. The attention given to the agreement in the press and
the market has therefore tended to compress the transitional period allowed in the
agreement itself, and fortified the efforts of the supervisors. Certainly, the agree-
ment has drawn greater attention to the need for banks to have adequate capital
and the market itself has therefore become more demanding in dictating what is
regarded as adequate.
In addition, apart from the need to make greater provisions for earlier lending
to countries that have faced difficulties in meeting their obligations, the period
since the agreement was signed has been a profitable one in most countries. This
has meant that banks have been able to enhance their capital by significant profit
retentions and to raise new capital in the market on reasonable terms. Rising
stock markets, especially in Japan, have also meant that a substantial increase in
new issues of bank capital has been possible without a damaging effect on bank
stock prices and therefore on the cost of that capital.
A great deal of attention has been paid to the equality of competition that the
agreement has achieved or failed to achieve. As has already been stated, com-
petitive equality was not the main objective and indeed could not be. A number
of factors to a varying extent outside the control of bank supervisors are just as
relevant to the ability of banks to compete on equal terms as capital adequacy
requirements. Tax is a particularly crucial factor and, although the supervisors
may have some influence in certain areas, for example, the treatment of provi-
sions, insofar as banks are taxed on the same basis as other corporations, their
influence may be quite limited. Similarly, accounting conventions used in banks
are normally based on those in use for all corporations and thus are outside the
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influence of supervisors. There are significant differences of treatment of, for
example, the valuation of assets. In some countries, companies, including banks,
are expected to value their assets at market value. These can include assets not
held for trading purposes, such as fixed assets employed in the business, includ-
ing bank premises. In other countries, assets are valued at historic cost, or at cost
less any permanent diminution in value. For a bank, such alternative accounting
can imply major differences in net worth. The structure of the domestic banking
system and the degree of permissible competition are again often the subject of
primary legislation, and the supervisor may only be one of several influences in
their evolution. Finally, the cost of bank capital depends not only on the prof-
itability of each country's banking sector but on the overall cost of capital in the
economy. Thus, Japanese banks, for example, have a considerable advantage
over banks from other countries, where earnings yields for quoted companies are
in general much higher.
Nevertheless, the agreement has highlighted these differences and to some
extent encouraged banks to find solutions. For example, it is not now uncommon
for banks to raise capital, admittedly only secondary capital, in markets other than
their own. Moreover, the internationalization or globalization of banking has
continued its inexorable path. And it is probably true that, to the extent that the
capital agreement has levelled the playing-field, it has contributed to that process.
Of course, the implication of higher capital ratios is that banks will need to earn
higher profits if they are to service the new capital that both the supervisors and the
market are requiring them to raise. Certainly, one of the factors alarming supervisors
in the 1970s and 1980s was the apparently never-ending erosion of margins of prof-
itability, while the risks, if anything, appeared to be growing. It is perhaps too soon
to say with much confidence that this process has been reversed. However, there are
signs that the deterioration has at least been halted, although the recovery in bank
profitability has probably taken place mainly in more protected domestic retail mar-
kets than in the market for international business.
II. Current Aspects of Cooperation
The capital agreement, of course, was not the end of the road. Although it
marked a change of gear, the process of international cooperation continues.
Much of the work currently under way is a continuation of the relatively un-
glamorous process of mutual understanding and the development of the means of
communication, so that problems with international ramifications can be dealt
with expeditiously. The Basle Committee is continuing to prepare papers on best
supervisory practice in a number of areas for circulation to supervisory author-
ities worldwide. For example, work is being done on the concentration of credit
risk, perhaps the most prevalent cause of bank failures, and on the systems of
internal controls that banks with advanced computer systems need to have in
place. This work demonstrates that capital adequacy requirements are but one of
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the pillars of bank supervision and, in many cases, by no means the most
important.
But the process of capital convergence nonetheless goes on. In the 1988
agreement there were a number of areas where the Committee was dissatisfied
with the degree of convergence achieved and wished to continue its work. The
most important of these relate to the definition of capital, in particular the
inclusion by many countries of general or unallocated provisions or loan-loss
reserves. Although the agreement allowed the inclusion of these elements, not all
members were wholly convinced that they were truly available to meet losses
wherever they might occur. In other words, there was a fear that such provisions
were not wholly clean but could be contaminated, for example, in respect of
country transfer risk. The Committee is committed to refining the definitions in
this respect by the end of 1990, failing which this element of capital will be
subject to a cap or ceiling.
Another aspect of growing importance is the treatment of "market" risks. The
1988 agreement confined itself in the main to the treatment of credit risk. The
taking of credit risk is the principal risk in nearly all banks, even those more
geared to wholesale markets. Nevertheless, all banks are capable of being ex-
posed to other risks, particularly the risk of changes in market prices or rates that
are not influenced by perceived changes in the credit-standing of a bank's coun-
terparties. The most common, and the risk that has caused the greatest losses, is
the risk that a change in the level of interest rates will affect the bank's income
and indeed its net worth. This is a risk that all banks, large or small, tend to run.
In less sophisticated times, it was almost an inevitable risk. Banks' borrowings
normally have a shorter average maturity than their assets. If interest rates rise,
earnings are depressed and, if assets have to be realized, so is a bank's net worth.
Indeed, in many countries, such losses have often been quite pronounced, par-
ticularly in the 1960s and 1970s, when deregulation of deposit rates coincided
with increased volatility of interest rates. The plight of institutions in the U.S.
mortgage loan business is a particularly extreme example, but similar develop-
ments have occurred in many other countries. More recently, the spread of
variable rate lending and the growing availability of liquid markets for interest
rate futures, forward rate agreements, and options has provided an opportunity
for banks to hedge the risk of such exposure. But more to the point, these
markets now allow banks to expose themselves to risk quite deliberately, and
such opportunities can now form the basis of a significant part of a bank's
risk-taking activity.
Similar opportunities are present in the foreign exchange market. Whereas in
the past foreign exchange positions had more often than not either been covered
or arose temporarily out of transactions with customers, now banks are more
actively seeking to make money by deliberately opening up foreign exchange
positions. As with interest rate risk, the ready availability of increasingly liquid
markets in derivative products make the taking of these positions that much easier.
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Finally, banks are becoming increasingly involved in securities trading activ-
ities, whether on their own balance sheets or by setting up affiliates or by
acquiring existing firns of securities dealers. Although there are credit risks
involved here, very often the risks are as much related to the level of interest
rates or, in the case of equities, to movements in the market as a whole. More-
over, there is some suggestion that national securities markets are behaving less
independently than before.
The nature of market risk is, however, very different from credit risk. When
a bank assumes a credit risk it normally anticipates a quantified but small gain,
the net interest margin over the life of the loan plus any fees payable, and risks
a much larger loss whose maximum extent is still ultimately quantifiable, that is
the total amount of the loan or guarantee. With market risk, potential profit and
loss are more nearly symmetrical and in theory almost limitless. Moreover, ex-
posure to such risks can in many cases change much more rapidly than is normally
the case with credit risk, particularly with the development of derivative markets.
For these reasons, and because of the complexity of the derivative products
available for banks to hedge and take these risks, measurement of the amount of
exposure is by no means as straightforward as it is for credit risk. Options are a
particularly difficult feature, both for banks and for their supervisors. The Basle
Committee has been studying these aspects for some time and has undertaken a
number of trials with banks to see whether it would be possible to devise com-
mon systems of measurement that would be reasonably simple but yet accurate
enough to form a satisfactory basis for prudential tools. Such tools might take the
form of systems of limits, which some supervisors already use, or possibly the
incorporation of capital requirements within the existing capital agreement. One
of the problems has been the need to establish systems that are consistent with
those used by bank managements themselves, particularly at a time when sys-
tems are changing and bankers themselves have differing views about the most
effective way these risks should be managed.
Supervisors feel that supervisory methods need to be as consistent as possible
with management control if they are to be understood by the banks and form the
basis for effective supervision. It has not proved easy to devise instruments that
are simple enough to form a common basis for supervision in all countries, yet
are precise enough to track the risks sufficiently adequately.
III. Relations with Securities Regulators
International work on the supervision of market risk, particularly in the area
of those risks involved in traded securities, has brought the banking supervisors
in contact with the regulators of nonbank investment firms. In some countries,
such as Germany and Switzerland, securities trading, both the issue and under-
writing of securities in the primary market and their secondary market trading,
are considered as banking business and require a banking license to be carried
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out. In these countries, such "universal" banks are subject to one set of super-
visors, who apply prudential requirements largely based on banking supervision
techniques, although some banks within their jurisdiction do concentrate more on
securities business than on conventional deposit taking or lending.
However, in other countries the bulk of securities trading business is carried
on by nonbanking firms subject to separate regulatory requirements. This is
true in Japan and the United States, where banking and securities dealings are
legally separated (although banks in both countries are allowed to carry on
government bond business and other forms of securities business in their
overseas affiliates) and also in a number of other countries where traditionally
securities business has been carried on in separate firms, although these may
be, and increasingly are, owned by banks. In a few such countries banks may
also now carry on securities business within the bank itself on the universal
bank model.
Securities regulators have for a number of reasons felt less need for interna-
tional cooperation than have banking supervisors. For a start, securities firms
have until recently been organized in respect of a single market. Where they have
opened establishments in other national markets, they have usually done so by
establishing affiliates and not branches. Moreover, the regulators have often
themselves either been organized stock exchange authorities or have delegated
detailed regulation to the exchanges. Furthermore, their conventional way of
dealing with a problem has been to reduce the firm's activities or, at the last
resort, to close it down. The method of regulation has therefore been designed
to ensure that firms did not engage in activities, such as the acquisition of assets
not readily liquefiable, which would preclude a rapid repayment of a firm's
creditors. As a result, securities regulators have not often seen the need for
consolidated supervision.
However, the breaking down of conventional barriers between banking and
securities trading has raised difficult questions of competition. All major inter-
national banks now carry on securities business, although in the United States
and Japanese cases this is largely confined to government bonds and securities
business in overseas markets. Moreover, the larger securities firms are increas-
ingly wishing to carry on significant business more of a banking nature, such as
foreign exchange, bridging loans, and swaps, in connection with the issue of
securities and the provision of a service in the secondary market to their cus-
tomers. Sometimes this is done by setting up affiliates with banking licenses and
sometimes through affiliates that are not supervised at all.
Supervision of groups that include both banks and regulated securities finns
has led to the need for an extension of the arrangements for the exchange of
prudential information between banking supervisors to include at least the major
securities regulators as well. But it is also leading to demands, both from banks
and securities firms, for a more level playing-field, or at least the removal of
rules that disadvantage one player in the market vis-A-vis another.
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This process has led to a fundamental conflict. On the one hand, there are
often sound prudential reasons why the method of supervision differs quite
significantly between banks and securities firms. For example, securities regu-
lators put a very severe penalty on the holding of assets that are not easily
realizable, while banking assets are acknowledged to be liquefiable only on
maturity. Banking supervisors for this reason require capital to be in a permanent
form, while securities firms are allowed short-term capital provided it is not
withdrawable so long as the assets are held that require it. On the other hand, as
the overlap between banking and securities trading becomes ever more exten-
sive, it becomes important to ensure that these differing regulatory regimes do
not unnecessarily distort the market.
The growing internationalization of the securities industry has led to discus-
sions on differing supervision regimes in IOSCO, the International Organization
of Securities Commissions, and also of joint meetings of securities regulators
from Group of Ten countries with the Basle Committee. No doubt these discus-
sions will continue and develop as the need grows for the establishment of a
framework for the supervision of financial groupings that include both banking
and securities businesses throughout the world.
IV. Relations with Other Supervisors
Of course, there are other forms of financial intermediation where the bound-
aries are being crossed. One principal area is the writing of insurance. In many
countries, insurance companies are undertaking activities close to banking, for
example, selling policies that resemble long-term deposits and acquiring secu-
rities which resemble bank loans. In some countries, banks are acquiring insur-
ance companies and vice versa. In all countries, insurance companies are regu-
lated under separate legislation and according to quite different principles.
Moreover, insurance regulators, like the regulators of securities firms, have not
yet felt the need to adopt the principle of consolidation. Whereas bank supervi-
sors no longer feel it is possible to rely on the corporate veil, and feel that a
banking group would be bound to protect its good name if an affiliate were to
come close to failure, most regulators of other intermediaries regard their re-
sponsibilities as extending only to the regulated entity.
It is probably safe to assume that the network of international cooperation will
widen further in the future to take in insurance regulators, who have yet to come
together in any international body, and, in those countries that have it, supervi-
sion of fund management and other intermediaries. There will still remain,
however, the difficult question of the supervision of groups where the parent
company is simply a holding company and is not, therefore, regulated. The only
major country to supervise holding companies is the United States where bank
holding companies are strictly limited to owning banks and subsidiaries con-
ducting business closely related to banking. The differing ways in which financial
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conglomerates exist in different markets, and their growing internationalization
is bound, therefore, to require increasing cooperation in the years ahead.
V. Relations with Other International Organizations "
Mention has already been made of the fundamental differences that still exist
in the way company accounts are prepared in different countries. With the
growing internationalization of the capital markets, there are increasing pressures
from investors and their agents to achieve some standardization of the way in
which company accounts are presented. For some years, the International Ac-
counting Standards Committee (IASC), on which are represented the accounting
associations in most major countries, has been endeavoring to achieve progress
in this area. Given the time necessary to reach agreement on accounting stan-
dards nationally, it is not surprising that this is a somewhat protracted process.
The IASC has also been specifically working on the form of bank accounts and
is also studying the treatment of new financial instruments. Although few bank
supervisory authorities have responsibility for accounting matters, the Basle
Committee has nevertheless maintained close contact with the IASC and sup-
ports its objectives.
Similarly, the Basle Committee has worked closely with the International
Auditing Practices Committee (IAPC) of the International Federation of Accoun-
tants. The IAPC and the Basle Committee produced a joint paper on the rela-
tionship between auditors and supervisors and the IAPC has also produced a
guideline on the special problems of auditing international commercial banks.
The role of auditors varies considerably from country to country. In some coun-
tries, considerable reliance is placed by supervisors on auditors, who are asked
to report to the supervisory authorities on particular aspects of a bank's proce-
dures, for example, its internal controls and accounting records. In other coun-
tries, the responsibility of the auditor to the bank's shareholders is regarded as
incompatible with the role of the supervisory authority. Nevertheless, in all
countries, the adequacy of external audits is clearly an important factor in se-
curing the sound management of banks, and the Committee is therefore keen to
ensure high standards in this area.
VI. Conclusions
This brief survey is intended to describe the extent of international cooperation
between bank supervisory authorities, the reasons why such cooperation has
become necessary, and the prospects for cooperation in the future. For several
centuries banks have operated internationally, whereas bank supervisors have
been constrained by the limits to their legal jurisdictions. And attempts by gov-
11. REPORT, supra note 8.
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ernments and their agencies to apply their jurisdiction extraterritorially are al-
ways resented and resisted. The only way, therefore, to ensure effective super-
vision of the modem international banking group, with its plethora of branches,
subsidiaries, affiliates, and investments, is by cooperation with the relevant
supervisory authorities in the other jurisdictions involved. As the organization of
banking groups becomes ever more complex, so necessarily does the need for
cooperation grow. Moreover, such cooperation must now extend to supervisors
and regulators of other financial intermediaries that, increasingly, are linked with
banks. Although much of banking supervision can be directed solely at domestic
operations of banks, the international dimension has become increasingly sig-
nificant. Whereas in the European Community there is much talk of a single
European market, for banks that market already exists; but, it is a global market
transcending regional boundaries. Increasingly, supervisors must act jointly if
they are to preserve the integrity and soundness of what has become a worldwide
banking system.
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